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ABSTRACT
Research on the CHREC Space Processor (CSP) takes a multifaceted hybrid approach to embedded space 
computing. Working closely with the NASA Goddard SpaceCube team, researchers at the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) Center for High-Performance Reconfigurable Computing (CHREC) at the University of Florida 
and Brigham Young University are developing hybrid space computers that feature an innovative combination of 
three technologies: commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices, radiation-hardened (RadHard) devices, and fault-
tolerant computing.  Modern COTS processors provide the utmost in performance and energy-efficiency but are 
susceptible to ionizing radiation in space, whereas RadHard processors are virtually immune to this radiation but are 
more expensive, larger, less energy-efficient, and generations behind in speed and functionality.  By featuring COTS 
devices to perform the critical data processing, supported by simpler RadHard devices that monitor and manage the 
COTS devices, and augmented with novel uses of fault-tolerant hardware, software, information, and networking 
within and between COTS devices, the resulting system can maximize performance and reliability while minimizing 
energy consumption and cost.  NASA Goddard has adopted the CSP concept and technology with plans underway to 
feature flight-ready CSP boards on two upcoming space missions.
1 INTRODUCTION
On-board computing is among the most critical needs 
of current- and future-generation spacecraft.  The 
requirements for processing devices in spacecraft are 
being driven by two major application areas: (1) sensor
processing (e.g. signal, image, and video compression 
and processing); and (2) autonomous processing and 
control (e.g., autonomous rendezvous, docking, and
formation flying). Due in large part to sensor, control, 
and mission-scope advancements in spacecraft systems, 
future-generation space computers will be tasked with a
much more considerable processing load than those in 
present-generation spacecraft, but they will continue to 
be constrained by the complex requirements to which 
all space systems must adhere, including both ionizing-
radiation effects and stringent restrictions on size,
weight, and power.
Current-generation space processors tend to permit
considerable, and perhaps unnecessary, compromises in 
certain requirements to satisfy others. A common 
design strategy for many space computers is to 
exclusively use RadHard (i.e., radiation-hardened) 
components for all subsystems. While this approach 
will almost certainly result in a reliable system, the 
compromises in performance, size, weight, power, and 
cost are far from insubstantial. Another design strategy, 
for missions in which requirements are not as stringent,
is to entirely use COTS (i.e., commercial off-the-shelf)
components. While an all-COTS solution might 
perform admirably in all other requirements, the 
reliability of the system is likely to be poor in a space 
environment.
Among the research goals of the CHREC Space 
Processor (CSP) project is the determination of a 
method by which we can intelligently combine
RadHard and COTS components to produce a hybrid 
computing system which has both more computational 
performance (among other benefits) than an equivalent 
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all-RadHard system, and higher reliability than an 
equivalent all-COTS system. Additionally, the CSP
project is concerned with researching how best to apply
the principles of fault-tolerant computing to augment 
the inherent reliability of a mixed RadHard and COTS 
computing solution for varying mission needs.
The realization of this research, the first production 
version of the CHREC Space Processor (CSPv1), is 
presented here. CSPv1 is a small computer that features
an innovative combination of three technologies: COTS 
devices; RadHard devices; and novel fault-tolerant 
computing techniques. By featuring COTS devices to 
perform the critical data processing, supported by 
simpler RadHard devices that monitor and manage the 
COTS devices, and augmented with novel fault-tolerant 
computing (in the form of hardware, software, 
information, networking, and time redundancy) within 
and between COTS devices, the resulting system can 
maximize performance and reliability while minimizing
energy consumption and cost.  CSPv1 is also designed 
to be scalable in application scope—by the use of 
multiple CSP cards in a system, most any computing 
performance requirement can be accommodated, from
CubeSats to large spacecraft. We will detail a number 
of the strategies and design decisions involved in the 
creation of CSPv1 in two categories, those concerning 
hardware architecture and those concerning software 
architecture.
2 BACKGROUND
The conventional wisdom in designing a space-
processing system is that, in order to ensure system 
reliability, it is necessary for all subsystems to be 
RadHard. Some representative designs of this sort are 
detailed in [1] and [2]. However, this approach is a 
costly strategy in many respects. In terms of 
performance per Watt, the processing devices in these 
systems are typically several orders of magnitude worse 
than modern commercial devices [3], and they also 
have a large size and mass footprint. Additionally, they 
are logistically costly, with lead times of several 
months, and three orders of magnitude more expensive
than equivalent COTS devices.
A comparison, based on the data and methods of [3], 
between a modern commercial processor (the Xilinx 
Zynq-7020 selected  for CSPv1), and several traditional 
RadHard processors is given in Table 1. It is apparent 
that the Zynq device considerably outperforms each of 
these RadHard devices in all respects, including 
performance per Watt — a very important metric for 
space applications. Additionally, it is worth noting that 
the Zynq device is much less expensive (on the order of 
$100) than RadHard processors. However, use of 
RadHard devices is pervasive, as the increased 
reliability resulting from a lack of ionizing-radiation 
effects is generally perceived to be worth the costs for 
certain applications.
Table 1: Normalized Performance of Zynq-7020
versus Common RadHard Processors [3]
Performance Parameter 
(Ratio of Zynq to Baseline) 
Baseline Devices
Aeroflex
Glasier
GR712RC
BAE 
Systems 
RAD750
Honeywell
HXRHPPC
Computation Performance
(32-bit integer)
591.8 178.0 591.8
Computation Performance
(32-bit floating-point)
1549.6 291.3 484.2
Performance per Watt
(32-bit integer)
235.5 236.1 1193.2
Performance per Watt
(32-bit floating-point)
549.6 344.4 870.2
Input / Output
Bandwidth
73.9 56.3 560.4
External Memory 
Bandwidth
106.6 40.1 No EMB
Broadly categorized, there are two different types of 
ionizing-radiation effects which are of concern for 
integrated circuits. The first is the consequences which
are as a result of long-term exposure to a large number 
of highly-energetic particles. The degree of this 
exposure is quantified by the Total Ionizing Dose 
(TID). The second type of effect which concerns 
integrated circuits is the result of highly energetic 
particles hitting critical areas of the die, causing 
temporary changes in the state of the device (though 
these temporary changes have the potential to cause 
permanent damage if unmanaged). These are referred to 
as single-event effects, of which there are several 
subcategories.
A number of COTS devices are capable of withstanding 
a fairly high TID, but COTS devices typically do not 
have particularly strong single-event immunity [4]. 
Devices similar in complexity to the Zynq, which is 
featured on CSPv1, have been tested and are known to 
have TID ratings that permit them to easily operate in 
low-earth orbit for a long period of time (on the order 
of several years) [5][6][7]. So, if the single-event 
effects can be properly managed, these types of devices 
have the potential to be viable for space systems.
With regard to both fixed-logic and reconfigurable-
logic devices, there is a great body of research 
concerning how to correct and manage single-event 
effects. Fixed-logic devices can track and correct 
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memory errors through parity information and temporal 
redundancy [8][9], and reconfigurable-logic devices 
(subject to a different set of possible errors) can be 
corrected and managed by means of periodic checking, 
and possible scrubbing, of their configuration, along 
with constructing hardware-redundant features in their
design [10][11][12]. Additionally, COTS devices can 
be managed and monitored by means of external 
hardware and supervisory circuits (as is the case for 
CSPv1).
3 HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE
The hardware of CSPv1 is designed to fit inside a 1U 
CubeSat form factor (10 cm by 10 cm), and is mated 
with the surrounding system perpendicularly though a 
backplane connector. The primary novelty of the 
hardware is the possibility to selectively populate any 
combination of RadHard and COTS components (for 
the monitoring systems) on the same Printed Circuit 
Board (PCB), permitting a spectrum of possible hybrid 
boards for different mission requirements. An image of 
the top side of this board (for the all-COTS variant) is 
shown in Figure 1; the regions which are unpopulated 
are reserved for RadHard components. Additionally,
CSPv1 makes use of a supervisor circuit to monitor the 
processing device in the event of an upset for which the 
processor is unable to internally accommodate.
Figure 1: Top of all-COTS CSPv1 Board
3.1 Device Selection
There are some types of COTS devices that might be 
generally inadvisable to use in space systems in which 
reliability is prioritized. Power-supply circuitry 
generally falls under this category—even a very short 
single-event effect which causes the output of the 
supply to be out of specification can result in system 
failure. The way that CSP discriminates between 
devices which should be RadHard and those which 
need not be RadHard can be summarized as:
If ionizing radiation effects of either type are a 
concern, and the device cannot be easily monitored
and managed, then it should be made RadHard.
The result of applying the above rule is that power 
supplies, supervisors, and sequencing circuitry are 
made RadHard, but the main processing device and its 
memory are not, as they can be monitored and 
corrected. Fortunately, the application of this rule 
results in a RadHard set of devices which are fairly 
simple in construction, and so result in a lessened 
degree of compromise. 
Table 2: Unmonitored Devices
Device Type COTS Vendor RadHard Vendor
NAND Flash Memory Spansion (1 GB) 3D-Plus (4 GB)
Switching Regulators Texas Instruments Peregrine Semi
Linear Regulators Texas Instruments Aeroflex
Supervisory Intersil Intersil
Power Sequencing Texas Instruments Texas Instruments
Reset Management Texas Instruments Texas Instruments
The devices on CSPv1 which cannot be easily 
monitored are able to be populated with either RadHard 
or COTS solutions. The vendors of these devices are 
shown in Table 2. There are also some devices, the 
monitored devices, which are always populated, and 
these are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Monitored Devices
Device Type Vendor Description
Processing Device Xilinx Zynq 7020, 485-ball BGA
Volatile Memory Micron 512 MB (Total) DDR3
An ancillary benefit of the population strategy of CSP 
is that low-cost development boards with all-COTS 
population can be used for software development, and 
the software need not change when moved to a flight 
(hybrid RadHard and COTS) board. These lower-cost 
development boards can be manufactured for about 
$1k, while flight boards can be made for about $10k.
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3.2 Processor Architecture
The Xilinx Zynq-7020 device used by CSPv1 contains 
a dual-core ARM A9 processor, and a 28nm Artix-7
FPGA fabric. Attached to the ARM side of this device, 
the CSP has 512 MB of DDR3 memory, with PCB 
support for 1 GB. Some specifications of the Zynq are 
given in Table 4.
Table 4: Xilinx Zynq-7020 Specifications
ARM Specifications
L1 Cache Per Core 32 KB Instruction / 32 KB Data
L2 Cache Shared 512 KB
Maximum Clock Frequency 667 MHz
FPGA Specifications
Programmable Logic Cells 85,000
Look-Up Tables 53,200
Flip-Flops 106,400
DSP Slices 220 (18 x 25 MACCs)
From a reliability perspective, the pairing of these two 
architectures on a single die is of considerable utility
for a space computer. They are able to communicate 
with and monitor each other, permitting a relatively
novel manner of fault-tolerance. The specifics of the 
mechanisms of this fault-tolerance are given in the 
section on software architecture.
3.3 Hardware Reliability Assurance
A number of mechanisms for ensuring a reliable system 
are designed into the hardware of CSPv1. One of these 
mechanisms is a power-sequencing circuit (RadHard if
necessary) which serves two functions: (1) ensure that 
the power rails are sequenced correctly; and (2) if a
regulator fails transiently, keep the Zynq in a protected 
reset state and send a control-flow signal over the 
connector so that appropriate recovery action can be 
taken.
In the event of a software fault which is not recoverable 
by software alone, the supervisory and reset 
management circuits (all of which can be made 
RadHard) will assist the Zynq to return to an 
operational state. The principle on which these circuits 
operate is continuously listening for a heartbeat signal 
from the Zynq and, in the event of the Zynq failing to 
provide this signal, the supervisory and reset 
management circuits will reset the Zynq and allow it 
appropriate time to boot up and send out the heartbeat 
again.
3.4 System Integration
All externally facing connections on a CSPv1 are made 
through the 160-pin Samtec Searay connector. In 
addition to debugging and control-flow signals, there 
are 60 high-speed connections from the FPGA portion 
of the Zynq, and 26 high-speed connections from the 
ARM portion of the Zynq. Of these 60 FPGA pins, 48 
of them can be configured as (24) differential-pairs for 
use with various high-speed interfaces. The ARM pins 
can be configured to be most any combination of I2C, 
SPI, CAN, and UART interfaces, or used as GPIO.
Figure 2: CSPv1 Mated with Evaluation Board
For ground testing and evaluation, CSPv1 makes use of 
an evaluation board with a considerable amount of 
convenient circuitry to permit rapid development. This 
board is shown, with a CSPv1 mated, in Figure 2. From 
the CSP’s FPGA signals, the evaluation board provides 
connectors for Camera Link, SpaceWire, and a number 
of spare single-ended and differential signals. From the 
CSP’s ARM signals, the evaluation board has gigabit 
Ethernet, and USB Host, capability. A secondary 
purpose of the evaluation board is to serve as a 
reference design for the integration of various interfaces 
and devices.
A typical system which includes a CSPv1 will have a 
passive backplane, to which one or more CSPs are 
connected, along with a power-supply board to supply 
the CSPs. CSPv1 requires the input of two rails, 3.3 
Volts and 5.0 Volts; the remaining voltages are 
generated on-board. Some typical power requirements 
for a single CSPv1 board, in different states, are given 
in Table 5. Though the table does not reflect it, we do 
anticipate that it is possible to produce FPGA designs, 
likely with a large number of external interfaces, which 
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could bring the power-profile of the board up to around 
4 Watts.
Table 5: CSPv1 Power Consumption
Clocks (MHz) Test Load
ARM DDR FPGA ARM FPGA Power (W)
200 200 100 Low Low 1.54
200 200 100 High Low 1.78
667 533 100 High Low 2.23
667 533 100 High High 2.86
4 SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
A body of software has been developed for, and applied 
to, CSPv1 in order to both support it as a space 
computer and improve system reliability. The specifics 
of how software is used to improve reliability is 
considerably different for each half (ARM and FPGA)
of the Zynq.
4.1 Utility Software
In order to facilitate development of space applications, 
a number of custom software components were 
developed for CSP. CSPv1 runs a custom, lightweight,
Linux-based operating system on the ARM cores of the 
Zynq which has extensions to support various 
operations, such as FPGA scrubbing (detailed later) 
which are necessary for reliable operation. Other 
extensions include those enabling easy communication 
with the FPGA side of the Zynq, which could, among 
other things, allow the FPGA to be used as an 
accelerator to the CPU program execution. It is also 
worth noting that there are a number of options for 
program acceleration with the Zynq. In addition to 
FPGA-based acceleration, the Zynq also has a NEON 
floating-point SIMD accelerator with each core, and the 
two cores in the ARM allow either OpenMP-based or 
MPI-based acceleration.
Concerning flight software, CSPv1 has integrated the 
Core Flight Executive (cFE) flight software framework
[13] (designed specifically for satellites and instruments 
on embedded platforms) and the Core Flight System
(CFS) [13] from NASA Goddard. With these software 
packages, a number of different applications for 
commanding, telemetry gathering, scheduling, health 
and safety, and file management are readily available.
4.2 ARM Software Reliability Assurance
Within the Zynq, the ARM processor is, to a degree, the 
master device over the FPGA and other parts of the 
system—it is connected to the non-volatile memory of 
the system, and is responsible for configuring and 
initializing the FPGA. As such, a great deal of care 
must be taken to ensure that the ARM device boots up 
properly. A number of precautions have been taken in 
the hardware and software of CSPv1 to make sure that 
this is the case. An outline of the boot sequence is 
shown in Figure 3. There are two types of fallback 
mechanism, depending on the stage in the sequence.
Figure 3: CSPv1 Boot Sequence
The first precaution in the boot-up sequence is a
method of verifying the correctness of boot images 
contained in the non-volatile memory. The CSP 
repurposes the RSA authentication features of the Zynq 
to check boot images. The intended purpose of this 
feature is tamper-prevention; however, it has proven
very capable of verifying the correctness of non-volatile 
memory contents. Additionally, it is possible to use 
fallback (an arbitrary number of times), if the image 
from which the Zynq is trying to boot is corrupted.
After the verification of a boot image, it is necessary to 
ensure that this image will remain uncorrupted as it 
moves to the volatile memory and is used by the 
processor. Memory errors are logged and corrected 
through several mechanisms at every level of the 
memory hierarchy. At the lowest level, both the L1 and 
L2 caches in the Zynq can trigger interrupts on parity 
failure. In main memory, ECC can be enabled (halving 
the usable memory capacity) which will automatically 
detect two bits, and correct one bit, of error per word in 
the DDR. Using error-detection and error-correction 
extensions to the kernel, these DDR faults can also be 
monitored and managed by software. Finally, in the 
NAND flash, there are several features which will 
likely ensure that no images, or scientific data, are 
corrupted. The Zynq controller for the NAND device 
has built-in support for ECC, and its reliability is 
augmented by bad-block support.
During normal operation (after boot-up), there are 
several measures to ensure correct program execution. 
In addition to the external supervisory circuit, the Zynq 
has three internal watchdogs (one for each ARM core, 
and one which monitors device hardware) which can be 
used to detect and correct faults. Additionally, several 
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fault-tolerant software techniques, including temporal 
redundancy and program health monitoring, are to be 
used on flight systems.
4.3 FPGA Software Reliability Assurance
One of the challenges of deploying an FPGA system in 
space is that its SRAM-based memory architecture 
makes it susceptible to high-energy particles which can 
cause corruption of the memory cells. A Single-Event 
Upset (SEU), a common occurrence in space 
environments, can lead to bit flips in configuration or 
data memory of the FPGA which can eventually lead to 
data errors or device failure if left unmitigated.  This
hazard is also an issue for the CSP; however, corrective 
measures have been included to prevent catastrophic 
system failure. The solution is configuration scrubbing, 
the process of quickly repairing these configuration bit 
upsets in the FPGA before they can accumulate to the 
point of rendering the device inoperable. Several 
techniques for scrubbing have been deployed in space 
missions [14], but each has tradeoffs with respect to 
detection and correction time, coverage of upset 
patterns, and fault localization.  
The configuration scrubber within CSP uses a readback 
strategy that continuously reads configuration data 
frame by frame (FPGA configuration data is organized 
into frames, with each frame consisting of 101 words or 
3232 bits). Each configuration frame is compared to the
golden frame contents stored in main memory. The 
golden frame data is generated by the vendor’s
bitstream-generation tools. A frame mask is also used 
to mask configuration bits within a frame that are 
known to change during operation. If a difference exists 
between a non-masked bit within the readback frame
and the golden frame, the configuration frame is 
overwritten with the contents of the golden frame. The 
location (frame, word, and bit) of any upsets within the 
configuration data is logged for post-processing and 
error analysis.
This scrubber only checks the configuration frames 
associated with the logic portions of the configuration 
bitstream (Block 0 frames). The configuration frames 
associated with internal block memory or BRAM are 
not scrubbed, since their contents change with normal 
functionality. In addition, BRAMs can be protected 
from SEUs by utilizing the built-in support of error 
correction coding (ECC).
One of the unique features of the CSP scrubber is that it 
supports partial reconfiguration of the FPGA logic. The 
scrubbing process is paused during partial 
reconfiguration to prevent the scrubber from “fixing” 
the configuration memory. Partial reconfiguration is 
then performed to update the configuration data with 
the new hardware circuitry. Before the scrubber 
resumes, the golden frame data and mask information 
associated with the partial reconfiguration is updated to 
reflect a change in the hardware, so that future 
scrubbing will not undo the partial reconfiguration. 
Once scrubbing resumes, the new partial configuration 
data is embedded in the golden file and will be used to 
verify the contents of the FPGA circuitry.
4.4 System Reset Methodology
The supervisor circuit on CSPv1 will reset the Zynq if it 
fails to put out a heartbeat signal. However, the exact 
strategy of determining what should cause the Zynq to 
stop outputting its heartbeat is a considerable research 
topic and design decision. Nominally, the heartbeat 
should stop only when the Zynq has encountered a fault 
for which it is completely unable to recover without 
assistance from the external circuit.
In order to achieve this outcome, the CSP uses a multi-
level heartbeat. The externally facing heartbeat (which 
is accepted by the optionally RadHard supervisor from 
Intersil) is sourced from the FPGA, and is internally
connected to a number of different pseudo-heartbeats 
from the different parts of the Zynq device. Some of 
these pseudo-heartbeats come from the ARM side of 
the chip (these are application health information), and
there are also pseudo-heartbeats from the different 
instantiated FPGA hardware elements. The intent of 
this scheme is that if some internally monitored element 
fails, its manager will attempt to reset or reinitialize it, 
and if that is not possible, the external heartbeat will 
stop, triggering a full system reset.
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced the CHREC Space 
Processor (CSP) as a new approach based upon the 
concept of hybrid space computing. By featuring COTS 
devices to perform the critical data processing, and 
simpler RadHard devices to monitor and manage the 
COTS devices, and augmenting them both with novel 
fault-tolerant computing techniques, CSP can maximize 
performance and reliability while minimizing energy 
consumption and cost, providing unprecedented 
computing capability in space.
CSPv1, the first production version of CSP, is designed 
to be selectively populated in various combinations of 
RadHard and COTS on the same PCB board, permitting 
a spectrum of possible hybrid boards for different 
mission requirements. It is also designed to be scalable 
in application scope — by the use of multiple CSP 
cards in a system, most any computing performance 
requirement can be accommodated, from CubeSats to 
large space systems.
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CSPv1 boards and their corresponding evaluation 
boards are currently being tested by various industry, 
government, and university groups partnered in
CHREC. Among these tests, CSPv1s (and the Zynq 
chip on which they are based) are being evaluated, or 
queued to be evaluated, for ionizing-radiation-induced 
upset performance, thermal and vacuum performance, 
and shock and vibration performance. The boards are
currently scheduled to fly on two upcoming missions 
through NASA Goddard. One is a technology mission 
(STP-H5/ISEM) on the International Space Station in 
which two CSPs will be paired together to evaluate 
hardware performance and collaborative algorithms in a 
space setting. The second (CeREs) is a heliophysics 
science mission in which a single CSP will be 
performing data processing in a small NASA satellite.
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